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IN DEFENSE OF PRIVATE ORDERINGS: COMMENTS




It is becoming possible for owners of intellectual property in digital
form to use technological protection instead of, or in addition to, copy-
right to control the use of their property. Professor Cohen argues against
legal changes designed to facilitate this development; I argue in favor of
them.
Her argument depends in part on conventional attacks on the legiti-
macy, hence the enforceability, of mass market contracts, in part on the
claim that such technologies threaten individual privacy and autonomy,
in part on the claim that copyright preempts alternative forms of protec-
tion-and should, since it produces more desirable outcomes.
Economic theory suggests no reason why mass market contracts
should be less enforceable than individually negotiated contracts-and
computer technology, in the form of "click-wrap" contracts, makes it
easier than in the past to create a legally adequate contract in a mass
market context. With the exceptioi of technologies that monitor software
use and report it, and ought, therefore, to be accompanied by suitable
warnings, technological protection of software poses no more threat to
privacy or autonomy than traditional forms of producer control over the
characteristics of their products. A private ordering of the market for in-
tellectual property, based on contract and technological protection, can
be expected to produce both more intellectual property and greater use of
existing intellectual property than the current "one size fits all" public
ordering of copyright law. Current developments in this direction ought
to be encouraged, not discouraged, by the law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Cohen's subject is the legal implications of technologies for
controlling the use of intellectual property in digital form. Most of these
technologies are unfamiliar to the majority of us; some do not yet exist.
One consequence, here as elsewhere in computer law, is that issues and
arguments tend to vanish into a fog of abstractions and (often misleading)
metaphors. In the hope of reducing that problem, I start with a brief sketch
of the technologies being discussed. I then go on to discuss parts of Pro-
fessor Cohen's argument that I think are mistaken and conclude with my
own views on the proper legal response to these technologies. Since the
draft of Article 2B which Cohen attacks is now history, I will ignore the
question of whether she has correctly interpreted its terms and concentrate
instead on the more important issue of what the law ought to be.
II. THE TECHNOLOGIES
I license software from you and fail, in your view, to meet the terms of
our agreement-perhaps I have fallen behind on my monthly payments.
Your attempts to persuade me to correct my failure are unsuccessful. You
resolve the problem by sending a message over the Internet to your soft-
ware on my machine, instructing it to cease operation-permanently.
This form of electronic self-help is somewhat misleadingly described,
by both Professor Cohen and the authors of the proposed revision to Arti-
cle 2B, as "repossession. ' '2 In practice, there is no need to repossess the
1. U.C.C. Article 2B (July 24-3 1, 1998 Draft).
2. See Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998).
[Vol. 13:1151
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software, since you can produce another copy at negligible cost. And, be-
cause you have no need to repossess the software, this form of electronic
self-help poses much less threat of either violence or breach of privacy
than does the repossession of physical goods.
A. Monitoring Use
There is a second form of technological enforcement to which Profes-
sor Cohen's privacy concerns are more relevant. Imagine that I am a com-
puter programmer who happens to be an orthodox Jew, with strong views
on the subject of working on the Sabbath. Not only am I unwilling to vio-
late the biblical injunction myself, I am unwilling to permit anyone else to
use the product of my labors to violate it. I accordingly include in the li-
censing agreement for my software a term forbidding the licensee from
running the software between sunset Friday and sunset Saturday.
In order to enforce the restriction, I design my software-which func-
tions online-to occasionally check date and time; if it discovers that it is
being run on the Sabbath, it sends me a message notifying me of that fact
and identifying the licensee. I respond-Sunday morning-with a mes-
sage to the software disabling it and a message to the licensee rebuking
him for violating my contract and God's law.
One can imagine many more conventional reasons why a licensor
might wish to limit the licensee's use of the licensed software and use
technological monitoring of one sort or another to enforce the restriction.
Someone licensing a compilation of information, for example, might
specify in the contract that the information is to be used only by the licen-
see and not made available to third parties. Providing the compilation em-
bedded in a program that monitored usage and reported on it to the licen-
sor would be one way of checking that the restriction was being obeyed. It
would also be a way of acquiring information about the licensee's activi-
ties that he might prefer to keep secret, hence a potential violation of the
licensee's privacy.
B. Restricting Use
There is, however, a third form of technological enforcement that pro-
vides a simpler solution to the problem faced by the Orthodox program-
mer--or the database licensor. Instead of monitoring usage, control it.
Every time the program boots up, it checks date and time-and shuts
down again if it is being used on the Sabbath. Program the database to
permit only a fixed number of queries per day. Instead of using technology
to monitor and report on usage so that the information may be used to en-
force the contract, use the technology to enforce the contract directly.
1998] 1153
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Technological enforcement is not a new idea; early examples include
copy protection of floppy disks and the practice of printing documents in
color schemes difficult to photocopy. What is new is the degree of detailed
control over use that such technologies, as envisioned by companies such
as IBM 3 and lnterTrust,4 promise to make possible. Ideally, such software
could make it possible for creators of intellectual property to give away
their product in encrypted form, enclosed in a digital container. The con-
tainer would provide information about its contents, possibly including
free samples, and a price list-so many cents per minute to watch a mul-
timedia presentation or per query to access a database. Charges might be
conditioned on the form of use as well as the amount-more to print out
images than to view them, a higher price for creating a freely accessible
user database out of a subset of the information in the encrypted database.
Payment would be online using digital cash.
Copy protection was for the most part unsuccessful, in part because it
significantly restricted legitimate uses, and in part because of technologi-
cal difficulties in preventing copying. 5 More sophisticated forms of tech-
nological enforcement will face similar problems. If those problems can
be overcome, the technology has the potential to provide, for at least some
forms of intellectual property, self-protection greatly superior in effective-
ness and flexibility to the protection now provided by copyright law-and
considerably less costly to enforce.
C. Contract Formation
In addition to technologies associated with enforcement of contracts-
shutting down software from off site, monitoring usage, and controlling
usage-there is one more online technology important to the background
of this discussion-the technology of contract formation. Sellers wish to
license their intellectual property under terms of their own devising; doing
so requires a contract with the buyer. For mass market software, individual
negotiation of terms is prohibitively costly. That problem is solved by
3. See Sam Albert, Surprise! IBM May Crash the Internet Party, -COM-
PUTERWORLD, June 10, 1996, at 41; Judith Evans, Want To Cryptolope?, NEWSDAY, May
21, 1996, at B23; Whit Andrews, IBM Retreats on Cryptolope, WebWeek, (Dec. 15,
1997) (visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.internetworld.com/print/1997/12/15/news/
19971215-cryptolope.html> (discussing recent change to the Cryptolope project); IBM
Corp., IBM Cryptolope Technology, (visited Nov. 22, 1998)
<http://www.software.ibm.com/security/cryptolope/>.
4.' See InterTrust Technologies Corporation, InterTrust Products and Services
(visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.intertrust.com/products/index.html>.
5. See Kory D. Christensen, Fighting Software Piracy in Cyberspace: Legal and
Technological Solutions, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 435, 466-67 (1997).
1154 [Vol. 13:1151
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form contracts-but there remains the problem of obtaining legally ade-
quate consent without a lengthy face-to-face transaction.
6
One possible solution is a shrinkwrap contract-a set of terms to
which the buyer is held to have assented by opening the container.7 The
legal validity of such "assent" is uncertain-as reflected in the reluctance
of some courts to enforce such contracts.8 Even if enforceable, shrinkwrap
provides an undesirably inflexible set of terms. Both buyer and seller
could be better off by customizing the terms to that particular buyer's re-
quirements-if it could be done without unreasonably high transaction
costs.
The solution is to move the transaction to the computer, converting
shrinkwrap to clickwrap. The seller's software provides terms-if desired,
a menu of options with prices. The contracting software-unlike a sticker
on a cellophane wrapper-can require explicit consent for the transaction
to proceed. It can even require the customer to spend a certain number of
seconds with the relevant terms on his computer screen before his assent
will be accepted. Hence, clickwrap provides a form of contract formation
more flexible and less legally dubious than shrinkwrap.
II. COHEN'S ARGUMENTS
Cohen's argument against permitting a shift in the mechanism for en-
forcing rights over intellectual property from the public law of copyright
to the private alternatives of contract and technological protection depends
on three claims:
1. The case for freedom of contract is problematic in the context of
mass market form contracts.
2. In* any case, freedom of contract is limited in this context because it
is preempted by copyright law, and
3. Whether or not it is preempted, it ought to be, because copyright law
produces a more attractive result than freedom of contract.
6. See generally LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT
LAW, 628-52 (5th ed. 1990).
7. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The
'shrinkwrap license' gets its name from the fact that retail software packages are covered
in plastic or cellophane 'shrinkwrap,' and some vendors ... have written licenses that
become effective as soon as the customer tears the wrapping from the package.").
8. A recent case supports enforceability. See id An older case was decided in the
opposite direction. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th
Cir. 1988). For an extended discussion, see generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Prop-
ertyAndShrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995).
1998] 1155
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I believe that all three are mistaken.
A. The Efficiency of Form Contracts
Professor Cohen writes, "In the mass market context, however, the ar-
gument from consent is far too simple. The market system established by
the U.C.C. bears little resemblance to the atomistic market of the neoclas-
sical, libertarian paradigm .... "9 Later she writes, "In the mass market,
consumers are contract takers; they can refuse to buy, or hold out for a
lower price, but they generally cannot demand a particular package of
contract terms or product characteristics."'
0
Cohen here resurrects the ancient error associated with the term "con-
tract of adhesion"-the idea that the argument for freedom of contract de-
pends on contracts being bargained and thus does not apply to the form
contracts common in mass market transactions.
To see why this is an error, consider the situation from the standpoint
of a firm drawing up a form contract under a legal regime recognizing
freedom of contract. It can specify any terms it likes-but those terms
only apply if the other party chooses to sign the contract. The characteris-
tics of what the consumer is buying include the terms of the contract under
which he is buying it; the less favorable those terms are to him-the more
easily, for example, they permit the seller to repossess the purchased
good-the less he will be willing to pay for the bundle consisting of the
good and terms of sale.
Suppose that, with a particular draft of the sales contract, the value of
the product to the buyer, and hence the highest price he will be willing to
pay for it, is $100. The seller" considers modifying the draft in his favor
by adding a term-perhaps an easy right of repossession-that makes him
better off by ten dollars and the consumer worse off by fifteen. Since the
value of the product is fifteen dollars less under the modified contract, so
is the maximum price the consumer will pay. Adding the term gives the
seller a ten dollar gain (lower legal costs if the sales terms are violated and
the product must be repossessed) and a fifteen dollar loss (reduction in the
price he can get from the buyer), for a net loss of five dollars. He is better
off with the original draft.
The generalization of the argument is straightforward. Any term in the
contract that provides a net benefit to the two parties also makes the seller
9. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1119.
10. Id. at 1125.
11. For convenience, I will not bother to distinguish between sales and licensing
agreements.
1156 [Vol. 13:1151
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better off, because gains and losses to the buyer are transferred to the
seller through their effect on the price the buyer is willing to pay. Any
term that provides a net loss makes the seller worse off. Hence, a rational
seller will design an efficient contract-a contract that maximizes the net
gain to buyer and seller combined. No bargaining is required.
The argument is a special case of a more general argument-that pro-
ducers have an incentive to design products with an efficient bundle of
characteristics. Putting tires on the wheels of cars, or radios in their dash-
boards, costs the seller something. Yet cars come equipped with tires and
radios-not because of any legal requirement that those features be in-
cluded, but because sellers recognize the effect of such characteristics on
the value of the product to the buyer.
As with any argument for economic efficiency, this one becomes less
rigorous as one shifts to a more elaborate picture of market transactions.
Consumers may make mistakes. Producers with monopoly power may use
product characteristics, including contract terms, as a way of charging a
higher price to consumers willing to pay it-an indirect form of discrimi-
natory pricing-at some cost in efficiency.
But none of this has anything in particular to do with intellectual prop-
erty or digital forms thereof-or, for that matter, mass market contracts.
These are qualifications to the general argument for free markets that ap-
ply to markets for bread and beer just as to markets for books and multi-
media software. One reason the qualifications do not destroy the argument
is that a more elaborate picture also allows for ways in which consumers
solve problems of imperfect information-via producer reputation, third
party evaluations, and other mechanisms familiar to us in the context of
cars and computers, and equally relevant in the context of elaborate con-
tracts and technologically protected software.
I do not know if Professor Cohen has considered the empirical ques-
tion of whether she is more likely to be cheated in the mass market context
of buying a car or the individually negotiated contract for fixing it, or
whether Microsoft Word is or WYLBUR12 was more likely to perform as
expected. The answer, judging by my experience at least, is that mass
market products are more likely to provide me the characteristics I want
and believe I am getting than more idiosyncratic products. This is in part
because the effect of reputational incentives on the producers of mass
market products and economies of scale in the generation of consumer in-
12. WYLBUR is the name of a mainframe text editing program whose misappro-
priation was the subject of an early computer crime case. See U.S. v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d
152 (1978).
115719981
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formation more than outweigh any advantage of being able to represent
my preferences in one-on-one bargaining.
Professor Cohen's argument, if correct, should apply to product char-
acteristics in general, not just to contract terms. Even a complex contract is
a good deal simpler than, say, a computer or automobile. If consumers
cannot be trusted to make a sufficiently informed decision about contract
terms, and we are therefore better off with the, fixed set of terms implied
by copyright law, how can they be trusted to make a sufficiently informed
decision about whether to buy a car with or without a supercharger or a
computer whose CPU does or does not have backside cache?
In arguing against the efficiency of mass market contracts, Cohen
sometimes writes as though bargaining is somehow a good thing-an end
in itself. Thus, we have "[t]he opposite rule, disallowing electronic self-
help unless authorized in a separately-negotiated agreement, probably
would encourage more 'bargaining' in that information providers most
likely would offer lower prices to consumers willing to agree to electronic
monitoring."'
13
This way of putting the argument gets it exactly backwards. The point
of choosing as default terms the terms most parties would bargain to is to
avoid of the cost of bargaining. If you want to encourage bargaining, the
way to do it is to have the legal system set default terms that nobody
wants, making it necessary to negotiate and explicitly agree to every detail
of every contract. That may be a desirable policy from the standpoint of
lawyers and law professors, since it would greatly increase the demand for
the services of both, but it is an undesirable policy from the standpoint of
everyone else.
B. Is Freedom of Contract Inconsistent with Copyright Law?
Phrases such -as "mass-market contracts that are inconsistent with
copyright"' 14 and "[1]imits on information ownership set by the public law
of copyright"' 5 reveal a subtle error in Cohen's argument-the belief that
copyright law gives consumers the right to use information in certain
ways. To see in what sense that is an error, consider Professor Cohen's
"fair use" right to quote the most recent draft of this Article immediately
after I finished writing it. Such quotation is clearly permitted under the fair
use exception of the Copyright Act. 16 But since the only existing copy of
the draft was on the hard disk of the computer in my office, Professor
13. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1126.
14. Id. at 1098.
15. Id. at 1090.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1992).
[Vol. 13:1151
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Cohen could not have accessed it, and thus could not have quoted it, with-
out violating the common law rule against trespass.What fair use and similar rules provide is not a right to copy informa-
tion, but a limit to the creator's right to use copyright law to prevent such
copying. That distinction is unimportant as long as the only way in which
the creator controls his property is through copyright law. But it matters in
contexts, such as trade secret law or technological protection, where other
forms of protection play an important role. Scientific laws are not patent-
able-but that does not make it illegal for me to put a lock on the door of
my research laboratory, or legal for my competitor to break in.
In a related vein, Cohen writes, "[the Court] has also held that [states]
may not grant property-like rights in unprotectable inventions .... On the
same reasoning, nor may they confer property-like rights in unprotectable
... works, or in unprotectable aspects or components of otherwise copy-
rightable works."' 
7
The legal point is correct-states cannot grant their own equivalent of
copyright, whether under the guise of unfair competition' 8 or in the form
of plug mold statutes. 19 But to describe contract as granting "property-like
rights" misrepresents the nature of property. The essential feature of a
property right-such as copyright-is that it is good against the world.20 A
contract right is good only against the party that signed the contract. A li-
censor can enforce contractual restrictions only against the licensee.
Technological protection is in a third category, neither property nor
contract. The producer of a good may, under ordinary circumstances, de-
sign it with whatever characteristics he likes. If I build a car that will only
last for five years, and tell you it will only last for five years, I am (from
your standpoint) achieving the same result as if I sold you only a five year
lease or required, as a condition of selling you the car, that you agree to
junk it after five years. But although the result is the same, the mechanism
is entirely different-I am controlling my product, not your rights.
17. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1130.
18. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co v. Steiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
19. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
20. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) ("But are
rights created by contract 'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright?' Three courts of appeals have answered 'no.' ... Rights 'equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright' are rights established
by law-rights that restrict the options of persons who are strangers to the author.") (in-
ternal citations omitted).
19981 1159
HeinOnline  -- 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1159 1998
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Similarly, if I give you my intellectual property inside a digital con-
tainer and inform you that in order to access it you must make online
payments according to the attached price list, I am achieving the same re-
sult I might have achieved. through a contract or (perhaps) a property rule.
But I am doing so through a non-legal mechanism. To argue that legal
rules designed to make self-enforcement easier are equivalent to the grant
of a property right is like claiming that legal rules permitting farmers to
use barbed wire are equivalent to land grants.
IV. WHAT COHEN LEAVES OUT
Central to Professor Cohen's paper is the special nature of intellectual
property, especially intellectual property in digital form. While she points
out special features of such property when their implications strengthen
her argument, she sometimes fails to do so when they weaken it. Consider
three examples:
A. Public Access Rights
Cohen writes:
Even the common law of property historically has recognized
certain public rights of access to or across the property of an-
other. Most closely analogous is the public trust doctrine, which
preserves a right of access across privately-owned land when
necessary to reach beaches and other areas that the law considers
to be commonly-owned. Similarly, the exceptions and exclusions
in copyright law preserve public access to the linguistic, cultural,
and scientific commons.2'
I clear the trees from a piece of land, dig out boulders, pile them into
stone walls, and thus make it suitable for farming. The land becomes, in
proper Lockean fashion, mine. The obvious justification for my ownership
is that it is my work that has given the land value, so it would be unjust-
as well as inefficient-to permit someone else to seize it for his use.
There is an important qualification to that argument, from both the
ethical and the economic perspective. Although the land was less useful
before, it was not entirely useless; other people could walk across it,
gather acorns, and-perhaps most importantly-other people could do
what I have just done. Now that it is my property, those options have van-
ished. If I acquire unrestricted control over the land, I am getting more
than I have produced-which may be unjust and may also lead to ineffi-
21. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1117.
[Vol. 13:1151
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cient rent-seeking as individuals clear land in part to appropriate its pre-
existing value.
22
One possible response to this problem is the Lockean proviso that my
acquisition of ownership depends on there being more land- "as much
and as good"-left for others to mix their labor with. The implications of
that restriction for modem society have been discussed by a number of
writers. 23 A second implication is that if my land happens to block the
only access to a valuable piece of the common land, other people may
have an easement-a right to cross it.
This is a persuasive argument for restricting absolute property rights in
real estate. It has at least some application to other forms of property, such
as cars, to the extent that they consist in part-perhaps a very small part-
of unproduced resources taken from the commons. The one sort of prop-
erty for which the argument makes no sense at all is intellectual property.
I read Shakespeare and Twain and Dante, and write my own novel-
thus mixing my labor with the metaphorical cultural commons. Having
written my novel, I tie it up good and tight with contract and technological
protection.
Have I taken something out of the commons? No. Shakespeare and
Twain and Dante are still there, just as available to the next author or
reader as before I wrote my novel. In the case of intellectual property, the
Lockean proviso is automatically satisfied-there is always as much and
as good, because my use of intellectual property does not leave any less
for the next user. The only thing I have locked up tight is my own crea-
tion.
22. See generally Terry Anderson & P.J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Im-
provement?, 50 S. ECON. J. 438 (1983) (discussing application to homesteading); David
Friedman, Standards As Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach, 19 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 1109 (1994) (explaining the application to intellectual property), also available at
<http://www.best.coml-ddfr/Academic/Standards/Standards.html> (visited Nov. .11,
1998); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON.
J. 224 (1967) (discussing the original rent seeking problem).
23. See generally ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); Baruch
Brody, Redistribution Without Egalitarianism, I SOC PHIL. & POL'Y 71 (1983); David
Friedman, Comment on Brody "Redistribution Without Egalitarianism," I SOC. PHIL. &
POL'Y 88 (1983), also available at <http://www.best.com/-ddfr/Academic/
Comment onBrody/Comment onBrody.html> (visited Nov. 11, 1998).
1998]
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B. Temptations to Repossess
Cohen quotes Robert Scott when she writes, "The challenge, then, is to
'design a pattern of reciprocal commitments that effectively constrains the
debtor without unduly tempting the creditor."' 24 She adds:
There are good reasons to think that electronic self-help would
create such risks. As Part I discussed, section 2B-310 would
authorize intrusion at the licensor's sole discretion; in this, it re-
sembles the "confession of judgment" clauses that Scott con-
demns as offering too great a temptation "to evade contractual
risks. 25
In the case of physical goods, there is an obvious reason why creditors
may be tempted to abuse their right to repossess-they want the goods. If I
have sold you a car and you have paid for it, I may still wish to repossess
it (assuming that, by some form of legal trickery, I can get away with do-
ing so) in order to sell it again to someone else. But if I sell you a com-
puter program and you pay me for it, I have no similar temptation-if I
want to sell someone else a copy, I can make another one at virtually no
cost. Hence the temptation to abuse the right of repossession is less for
intellectual property than for other forms, not more, making the argument
for restricting that right weaker, not stronger.
Cohen comments on this feature of intellectual property elsewhere 'in
her Article, when she argues that the right to electronic repossession may
not permit the producer to charge lower prices,26 because "the supply of
copies is infinite and virtually costless., 27 The premise is correct; the con-
clusion is not. While repossession gets the producer nothing, the threat of
24. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1122.
25. Id. at 122.
26. See id. at 1120 ("First, the 'lost value' attributable to a product whose value lies
chiefly in its public good aspect is inherently speculative. Failure to recover a car after
the buyer defaults precludes the secured creditor from recovering a portion of its invest-
ment; failure to recover a copy of a creative or informational work does not preclude the
information provider from realizing a profit on the work. Particularly in the case of digi-
tal works, the supply of copies is infinite and virtually costless, and there is no necessary
or inevitable relationship between the price charged to consumers and the value invested
in each copy.").
Failure to recover a car after the buyer defaults does not preclude the producer from
realizing a profit on total sales of that model of car. It does not even guarantee that the
producer will not realize a profit on that particular car - the default might have occurred
on the last month's payment. But being unable to enforce the terms of the sales agree-
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repossession may result in his getting paid. The more likely it is that pro-
ducers will be paid, the lower the price they can and, in a competitive
market, will charge for their goods. One of the virtues of electronic self-
help is that it lowers the cost of enforcement and thus makes the threat
more credible.
C. Enterprise Repo, Inc.
Professor Cohen writes, "Imagine, for example, that a team of high-
tech repo men had just used a transporter device to 'beam' your sofa out of
your living room and back to the furniture store. It would be difficult for
the creditor to convince you that no intrusion had occurred.,
28
How difficult it would be to convince me would depend on how the
team managed the repossession-whether by first beaming itself into my
living room before beaming the sofa out, by merely inspecting my living
room and occupants at long distance in the process of targeting the sofa
for removal, or simply by pressing a button that automatically sent the
sofa back to the warehouse. The final case is the one corresponding most
closely to electronic repossession. 29 While it might be inconvenient, espe-
cially if I happened to be sitting on the sofa at the time, the appropriate
analogy is not to physical repossession but to a disk crash or software fail-
ure "beaming out" my desktop computer by converting it into an oversized
paperweight. I have had the experience, more than once, of discovering
that a timed demo copy of a computer program had timed out-and while
sometimes inconvenient, it did not feel in the least like an intrusion or a
violation of my privacy.
Thus, when Cohen writes that "Article 2B sanctions a degree of intru-
sion into private homes and offices that is unprecedented," she ignores
the fact that what is being sanctioned is a form of virtual "repossession"
very much less intrusive than the physical repossession covered by the
precedents.
V. IS THE SHIFT TO PRIVATE ORDERING A GOOD THING?
On at least one point, I agree with Professor Cohen. 3 1 Article 2B re-
flects an important shift currently occurring in the ways in which creators
28. Id at ll06.
29. Repossession based on monitoring of activity is more like the intermediate case
and raises more serious privacy issues.
30. Cohen, supra note 2, at 101.
3 1. A second agreement is on the undesirability of law that treats software capable
of defeating technological protection as the digital equivalent of burglar's tools. If such
laws exist, producers who wish to sell such software openly will embed it in more general
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of intellectual property control their works and get paid for their efforts.
The shift is from dependence on the public law of copyright to dependence
on contract and self-enforcement-from a public to a private ordering.
Professor Cohen believes the change is for the worse; I believe it is for the
better.
A. Does Private Ordering Threaten Individual Privacy?
One of the arguments Cohen offers is the claim that the shift threatens
important values associated with individual privacy. That claim is false
with regard to two of the three technologies under discussion. The ability
to disable software in response to a perceived breach of the licensing terms
poses no more threat to privacy than a building contractor's ability to call
up an employee working on a job and tell him that, since the customer is
refusing to pay, he should stop working. Software that controls its own
usage poses less of a threat to privacy than any alternative mechanism for
enforcing contract terms, because it does not require any human being to
monitor usage.
The claim is true with regard to a third technology-the use of soft-
ware to monitor usage and report it to the software's creator. Hence, a
producer who embeds such features in his software ought to be obligated
to disclose them to the purchaser. Subject to such a disclosure require-
ment, such software poses precisely the same sort of threat to privacy as
any other mechanism by which A acquires information about B with B's
consent and knowledge-a frequent and probably inevitable occurrence in
modem society.32
Cohen appears to recognize the weakness of her privacy argument in
the context of software that enforces restrictions on its use, and falls back
on the alternative claim that even if such software does not violate privacy
in any literal sense, at least it violates autonomy. Thus, she writes, "Pri-
vacy protects certain spaces not only to shield personal behaviors from
observation by others, but also to preserve a zone of autonomy from inter-
ference by others." 33 She adds, "In a sense, the intrusion (or at least its
but-for cause) occurred much earlier, when the licensor determined that
purpose software, making it difficult to enforce the law without hindering legitimate ac-
tivities. In any case, the nature of the online world makes the enforcement of such laws
against covert distribution of the banned software virtually impossible.
32. However, this is an occurrence that can, and perhaps will, be made less frequent
in future online transactions by the use of encryption, digital cash, and related technolo-
gies. See David Friedman, A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and Perils of Encryp-
tion, 13 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY 212 (1996).
33. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1108.
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consumers in their private homes and offices would be allowed to take
certain actions but not others."
34
The problem with these statements is that a producer necessarily de-
termines what his product will or will not do in the process of designing it;
it is an odd use of language to describe the failure of a product to do things
that I would like it to do as an intrusion or as interference by others in my
zone of autonomy.
Professor Cohen responds to this line of argument when she writes:
The freedom of contract argument for unfettered electronic
regulation of performance ... conflates choice with submission
and product capabilities with control of behavior. Your vacuum
cleaner cannot fly, or clean your oven, and you have no particu-
lar right to one that can. However, except in special cases gov-
erned by the patent laws, within private spaces you ma use a
lawfully-acquired vacuum cleaner in any way you see fit.
But applying this to self-enforcing restrictions-my third category of36 , ,,
electronic protection -- confuses "may use" in the sense of "is not illegal
for you to use" with "may use" in the sense of "others must make it possi-
ble for you to use." If my software turns itself off on the Sabbath, you still
may use it on the Sabbath-but you can't.
In Cohen's sense, product capabilities do control behavior-your vac-
uum cleaner's inability to clean your oven restricts your oven cleaning be-
havior, just as copy protection built into a computer program restricts your
copying behavior. Perhaps the distinction she intends is between restric-
tions that exist because it would be costly to avoid them-by building a
vacuum cleaner with an oven cleaning attachment-and restrictions that
exist because the producer of the product does not want you to use his
product in certain ways. That might for some purposes be an interesting
distinction, but lots of existing products already fit into the second cate-
gory-and that fact has not in the past been considered legally problem-
atic.
Consider the original Macintosh computer. It was intended as an easy-
to-use tool for a mass market, including many people who could not be
trusted to work on the machine's internals without injuring either it or
34. Id at 1109.
35. Id. at 1115.
36. Professor Cohen makes it clear that this is the sort of protection that she is con-
cemed with when she writes, "My concern here is with the new kind of self-help that
digital technologies allow-self-help that consists solely of 'dumb,' hard-wired preven-
tion of unauthorized conduct." Id. at 1107.
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themselves. Hence, instead of designing the case to fasten with ordinary
screws, Apule designed it so that it could only be opened with a set of spe-
cial tools. This was precisely the real-world equivalent of electronic
regulation of performance. I am left wondering whether Professor Cohen
believes that Steve Jobs, in designing the computer that way and selling it
to me, intruded into my privacy and violated my zone of autonomy.
Again, Professor Cohen writes, "In sum, Article 2B proposes to arro-
gate to private information providers the power to reach into customers'
homes and offices and literally shape their behavior-in many cases with-
out even the courtesy of express contractual notice."
38
Information providers are not the only ones with that power-Profes-
sor Cohen has it too. When she revised the article to which I am replying,
she reached out into my office and shaped my behavior-forcing me to
remove one of my favorite passages from my response because it no
longer applied to her revised version. And she did it, as best I can-recall,
without any contract at all. Human beings are continually shaping each
other's behavior--consider the enormous effect that the inventors of mod-
em computer technology had on both my behavior and Professor Cohen's.
The appropriate limit to such shaping is not an elaborate set of rules de-
fining what characteristics products (or journal articles) may have, but the
simple rule of mutual consent-if I do not like what she does with her ar-
ticle, I do not have to write a comment on it. If I do not want to use com-
puters, I can forgo a new Mac in favor of an abacus and a box of clay
bricks.
Cohen writes: "Yet if reasonable expectations are defined solely by the
limits of technological possibility, privacy has a bleak future."
39
I agree 4-and that is a good reason to oppose FBI proposals to make
mass wiretaps cheap and easy. But the limitations of privacy that Professor
Cohen is currently discussing require the consent of the victim, whether
explicitly by contract or implicitly in the purchase of a product with
known characteristics. Such intrusions will be restricted not merely by the
37. See Richard Spaulding, Improving the Apple's Core, SAN DIEGO UNION &
TRIB., Mar. 18, 1986, at AAI.
38. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1117.
39. id at 1107.
40. 1 interpret Cohen as referring to the technology of invading privacy. We would
get a more attractive result in a world where it was the protection, not the invasion, of
privacy that was limited only by its technology-a world where, for example, strong
public key encryption and related technologies were legally unrestricted and widely used.
See Friedman, supra note 32, at 213-17.
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limits of technological possibility but by what consumers are willing to
put up with-and at what price.
Nothing in present law prevents me from proposing to a key employee
or business partner that he have a small transmitter attached to his leg,
even surgically embedded, in order that I can monitor his movements to
make sure he is not visiting my competitor or absconding to South Amer-
ica. Such a device is well within the limits of technological possibility. Yet
we do not observe such precautions-except in the involuntary relation
between convicts and the criminal justice system.4' We do not observe
them because the price I would be willing to pay to buy consent to such an
intrusion is, in almost all cases, lower than the price the other party would
be willing to accept.
B. Does private ordering provide adequate notice?
Throughout this discussion, I have taken it for granted that the trans-
actions we are considering-in particular, the purchase of software with
usage restrictions embedded in it-are voluntary. Cohen might disagree.
She writes, "Effectively, section 2B-310 would allow information provid-
ers to contract around copyright law without disclosing that fact to us-
ers."42 She adds, "Given the severity of the consequences and the inability
of most consumers to evade them, lack of notice of the possibility of elec-
tronic self-help is simply unfair."
43
These and similar passages make it sound as though all she wants is
full disclosure by sellers of any restrictions on use built into their products.
That seems a reasonable requirement-one whose only cost is a little extra
paper and ink reproducing a properly designed paragraph of boiler-plate
prose or the still less expensive electronic equivalent.
But Professor Cohen also writes, "It is worth noting, too, that none of
the cases concerning electronic self-help has involved a non-negotiated,
mass-market contract; thus, no court was required to consider whether the
'notice' afforded consumers by standard-form provisions is enough to
validate electronic self-help."" She then goes on to devote much of Part
IV of her Article to arguing that, in the context of mass market contracts,
agreement is not really consent.
So the implication of her argument is not that producers should be free
to build electronic self-enforcement into their products, provided they are
41. See Clem Richardson, Jailers Experiment With Electronic Tags, NEWSDAY,
Apr. 10, 1991, at 20.
42. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1098.
43. Id. at 1112.
44. fd. at 1112.
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honest with their customers about what they are getting-a position with
which I would agree-but rather that no mass market contract the pro-
ducer can write will provide sufficient notice to justify such products.
What is presented as an argument in favor of disclosure is in fact an argu-
ment against freedom of contract. As Cohen writes, "The problem here is
not lack of 'bargaining' per se, or even lack of knowledge, but rather lack
of consent and inability to affect the options on the table."
45
That might be said with as much, and as little, truth about almost any
mass market consumer product.46 The implication-whether Professor
Cohen would accept it I do not know-is that the characteristics of cars,
computers, and television sets, as well as those of computer programs,
ought to be set by the courts or Congress, not by the market.
C. Is copyright more efficient than private ordering?
So far I have dealt with a line of argument based on issues of privacy,
autonomy, and the like. Cohen's other argument is a broad claim that the
inflexible mechanism of copyright is superior in its results to the more
flexible private alternatives. She writes:
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the copyright system pro-
motes the social goals of creative progress and public access to
creative works in important ways that the market cannot meas-
ure. Because it is difficult to assess creative potential ex ante, ...
and because current information providers may perceive some
works (for example, parodies) as detrimental to their interests,
there is no reason to think that giving information providers
control over all uses of their information products would result in
more or better creative progress. ... In this respect, the enhanced
accessibility of creative and informational works under copyright
law produces important external benefits that most likely would
be underproduced by a private-law market-based regime. In
short, the copyright regime of limited rights and user privileges
not only serves nonmonetizable and distributional concerns, but
those concerns also are central to a particular understanding of
creative and social "progress.
'4 7
The argument has two parts. The first is the claim, surely true, that the
market will not produce a perfectly efficient outcome, in part because
some of the benefits from intellectual property cannot be captured by the
producer and so will be ignored in his calculations of what to produce. The
45. Id. at 1126.
46. See Friedman, supra note 32, at 212.
47. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1128.
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second is the claim, surely false, that the particular set of legal rules im-
posed by copyright can be expected to produce a more nearly efficient
outcome than the freedom of contract alternative.
48
The claim is false for two reasons. First, and most obviously, the more
flexible regime allows the producer to capture more of the benefit from
what he produces-that, after all, is why sellers of intellectual property
would choose to use contract and self-enforcement instead of relying en-
tirely on copyright. The higher the return to producing intellectual prop-
erty the more intellectual property will be produced. Hence, to the extent
that the creation of intellectual property is a purpose of copyright law, it is
a purpose better served by permitting other options as well.4 9
Second, and less obviously, the private alternatives to copyright result
in more, not less, use of such intellectual property as is produced. The
standard economic argument against legal protection of intellectual prop-
erty is that it results in owners of intellectual property charging a positive
price for its use even though the marginal cost of one more use is zero.
Thus, copyright results in an inefficiently low number of copies.
5 0
Private enforcement does not eliminate that problem but it does reduce
it. The more flexible the pricing options, the easier it is for the seller to
charge a high price to the high-volume, high-value user, and a low price to
the low-volume, low-value user, capturing revenue from the former with-
out losing sales to the latter. s' The seller of a database designed to charge
by the query can and will make it available both to the casual user, who
uses a few dollars worth of queries a month, and to the commercial user,
who uses a few thousand dollars worth a month. The same seller, re-
stricted to the terms of copyright, including the doctrine of first sale, finds
48. Cohen would probably say that the outcome is better, but not necessarily more
efficient. She writes, "Allocative efficiency is a poor measure of social welfare, however.
Social welfare is in part a function of nonmonetizable values, external effects, and dis-
tributional concerns, all of which the allocative criterion ignores." ld at 1127. But this is
to misunderstand the concept of economic efficiency. External effects are sometimes
ignored by the market, but if so, the result is to reduce the efficiency of its outcome-that
is why economists have traditionally proposed Pigouvian taxes as a way of making mar-
ket outcomes more efficient. It is true that efficiency ignores distributive issues-but, as I
point out below in discussing her reference to "distributional concerns," it is hard to see
how that limitation can be used to derive an argument for her conclusion.
49. For an analogous argument, see Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Se-
cret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991), also available at <http://www.best.com/-ddfr/
Academic/TradeSecrets/TradeSecrets.html> (visited Nov. 11, 1998) (defending the
efficiency of permitting trade secret as an alternative to patent).
50. While the absence of copyright results in an inefficiently low number of origi-
nals available to be copied.
51. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996).
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that he must charge a single price to all users for unlimited use-and sets
that price at a level that eliminates the casual user.
Cohen is concerned that some uses currently permitted by the doctrine
of fair use will be prohibited, or at least charged for, under the private al-
ternative. That may well happen; But the doctrine of fair use is constructed
in a way that for the most part limits it to uses whose economic value is
low-uses which it is in the interest of the producer to permit at a low
price. Indeed, one economic justification for the doctrine is that it permits
use of intellectual property in contexts where the transaction cost of li-
censing is higher than the value of what is licensed. If the transaction cost
is radically reduced, the size of that category will shrink.
Cohen offers the counterexample of parodies and the like-uses of in-
tellectual property which the owner might want to prevent rather than
charge for. It is hard to believe that the effect of technological protection
on this class of uses will be significant. Technological protection may pre-
vent me from copying your work, but it cannot prevent me from viewing it
and then writing a critique or parody. Conceivably, a product's licensing
terms could include an agreement not to publish anything critical about
it-but it would then be an adequate critique to simply publish the exis-
tence of such a requirement, a fact that any reader could easily verify for
himself by trying to license the software.
52
If the social goal of the copyright system is to promote progress and
the useful arts by increasing the quantity and accessibility of intellectual
property, that goal is an argument in favor of the shift towards private or-
dering, not against.
We are left with Cohen's somewhat cryptic references to distributional
concerns. Most intellectual property transactions occur between firms; it is
hard to see how rules that favor firms that consume intellectual property
over firms that produce it (as Cohen apparently believes the current copy-
right system does, at least relative to the private alternatives) are likely, on
average, to make rich people poorer and poor people richer, which I pre-
sume is what "serves .... distributional concerns" 53 is supposed to mean.
52. A political theorist named Andrew Galambos argued that ideas were the pri-
mary form of property, claimed a property right in his own ideas, and required his stu-
dents to agree not to repeat them. That may be one of the reasons you have never heard of
him. The tactic does not recommend itself in a commercial context either. See generally
Synergy Server, About Andrew J. Galambos (visited Nov. 11, 1998)
<http://www2.banned-books.com/ft/ftpeople/ajg/about.html>; Synergy Server, What Is
Property? (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www2.banned-books.com/ft/ftpeople/ajg/
define/property.html>.
53. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1128.
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Some transactions involve consumption of intellectual property by pri-
vate consumers-buying and reading a book, for example. But insofar as
the shift to a private system has any distributional effect on ultimate con-
sumers, it ought to be in the opposite of the direction Cohen implies. Pri-
vate enforcement permits a greater degree .of price discrimination. Rich
people are, on average, willing to pay more for things than poor people,
and a well designed set of discriminatory prices requires them to do so.
Cohen's general argument exhibits a feature unfortunately common in
arguments opposing changes that substitute private markets for centralized
control. When considering the attractiveness of the market alternative, she
imposes high standards of proof-any failure of the real world situation to
meet theoretical conditions for perfect economic efficiency is adequate
reason to ignore the economic arguments for the tendency of private mar-
kets to produce efficient outcomes. When considering the alternative or-
dering-in this case, the one size fits all terms of copyright-no theoreti-
cal argument is offered nor, apparently, needed. It is.enough to point out
that in a world where protection is limited to copyright someone, some-
where, will be able to use some piece of intellectual property for free that
he might have to pay for under a system of self-enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION
We are faced with two alternative approaches to organizing the pro-
duction and distribution of intellectual property: the public ordering de-
fined by copyright law and the private ordering implied by freedom of
contract and the technologies of digital monitoring and self-enforcement.
In a fully efficient world, as that concept is understood by economists,
every good, including every possible item of intellectual property, would
be produced if and only if the net costs of pioducing it were less than the
net benefits. In the real world, under either approach, that objective is un-
attainable. Real world markets necessarily omit from their calculations
some benefits and some costs, whether because consumers are imperfectly
informed about what they are consuming or because producers are unable
to internalize all benefits, and are not required to internalize all costs, as-
sociated with their production. That will be as true in the market implied
by a private ordering of intellectual property as it is true in other markets.
Here, as elsewhere, the argument for the market is not that it is perfect,
but that it is less imperfect than the alternatives. Under the public law of
copyright, producers are less able than under private contract to internalize
the value of what they produce, hence less likely to produce those goods,
with those characteristics, that maximize the net benefit from their activi-
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ties. Hence the result can be expected to be less, not more, efficient than
under the private alternative.
Seen from the economic standpoint, the fundamental justification for
the public law of intellectual property is a market failure. That failure is
not, as Cohen seems to believe, the failure of producers of intellectual
property to take account of external or nonmonetizable or distributional
consequences of their activity-if that were the problem, the solution
would be not copyright, which suffers from the same problems, but some
form of public subsidy.
The market failure that justifies the law of intellectual property is the
difficulty of enforcing a producer's rights in what he produces. It is only
because, in a world where it is difficult for producers to prevent or observe
unauthorized copying, contracts to control the use of intellectual property
are to a large degree unenforceable, that modem law provides a form of
property protection as an alternative. Insofar as digital technology is
eliminating that market failure, we should adapt our legal rules to encour-
age the change, not to block it. Cohen would prefer to persuade the cripple
who has finally been cured that he should retain crutches rather than risk
the harebrained adventure of walking.
This final metaphor suggests an important question that neither Cohen
nor (for different reasons) those on the other side of the issue have dis-
cussed: is copyright law becoming obsolete, and, if so, ought it to be
abolished? If the crutch is no longer needed, should we discard it?
My own view is that, in the limited area of online transactions involv-
ing intellectual property in digital form, copyright law will, over the next
few decades, become increasingly irrelevant, in part because better alter-
natives will become available, and in part because it will become increas-
ingly unenforceable. 54 1 leave to some future conference the further impli-
cations of that change.
54. See generally Friedman, supra note 32.
[Vol. 13:1151
HeinOnline  -- 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1172 1998
